Aceh

Afghanistan

Ambon

Bangladesh

Central Sulawesi

China

East Timor

Indonesia

Jakarta

Java

Kalimantan

Malaysia

Marawi

Myanmar

Papua

Philippines

Poso

South Sulawesi

Southeast Asia

Sulu-Sulawesi Seas

Sumatra

Syria

West Java

West Kalimantan

West Sumatra

Research Reports

Who We Are

Our Research Team

Our Board

About

What We Cover

Publications

News & Media

Contact Us

large_Logo Vertical

medium_Logo Vertical

small_Logo Vertical

thumbnail_Logo Vertical

Logo Vertical

facebook.png

Facebook

Group.png

LinkedIn

Instagram

[Jakarta, 20 February 2025] The lives of three men in their fifties &ndash; two recently arrested, one about to be released &ndash; suggest that the risk of a resurgence of violent extremism in Indonesia may depend on how well authorities can manage multi-generational homegrown groups that have never wavered in their desire for an Islamic state.
<a href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/%28IPAC_Report_102%29Indonesia-the-Danger-of-Middle-aged-Extremists.pdf.pdf">Indonesia: The Danger of Middle-Aged Recidivists</a>, the latest &ndash; and last report of IPAC as we come to a close after twelve years &ndash; examines the trajectories of three men, all recidivists, who came of age in the immediate post-Soeharto era, when Indonesia was wracked by communal conflict in Ambon and Poso. Two, Abu Umar and Saiful Muhtohrir, had joined the old Darul Islam insurgency in their early twenties, long before the Ambon conflict erupted, but both went to fight there. The third, Sulthon Qolbi joined Mujahidin KOMPAK to fight in Ambon and then stayed there to live. Saiful and Sulthon both became ISIS supporters, but Abu Umar, who was opposed to ISIS during his first stint in prison, was more interested after his release in uniting all groups committed to an Islamic state in Indonesia than in supporting the global jihad per se.
&ldquo;The history of these men is a reminder that&rsquo;s it not just the young hotheads surfing the Internet who may be interested in violence,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, senior adviser to IPAC. &ldquo;It&rsquo;s also the older militants who saw sectarian conflict first hand and became convinced that only an Islamic state could prevent its recurrence.&rdquo;
Abu Umar was released in 2019 after serving most of a ten-year sentence. He began immediately getting back in touch with his old associates and was rearrested in late 2023. Sulthon Qolbi was released in 2018 after serving most of a 15-year sentence and was rearrested in late 2024 in Ngruki, Solo for leading pro-ISIS discussions for a group that included a few other former prisoners. &nbsp;Saiful Muhtohrir, who is still considered high-risk, will be released later this month.
&nbsp;
&nbsp;

Cover image 2.jpeg

The lives of three men in their fifties – two recently arrested, one about to be released – suggest that the risk of a resurgence of violent extremism in Indonesia may depend on how well authorities can manage multi-generational homegrown groups 

Indonesia: The Danger of Middle-Aged Recidivists

[Jakarta, 17 February 2025] Sulu&rsquo;s exclusion from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) via a Supreme Court ruling serves the interests of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the short term and no one in the long term. The decision reinforces the power of traditional clans and marginalises the ethnic Tausug component of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an outcome that could have serious security consequences.
<a href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/%28IPAC_Report_101%29-PHILIPPINES-THE-IMPACT-OF-SULU%27S-EXCLUSION-FROM-BARMM-%281%29.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Philippines: The Impact of Sulu&rsquo;s Exclusion from BARMM&rdquo;,</a> the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) examines the impact of the September 2024 ruling on the BARMM elections, Sulu politics, and relations between the islands and the mainland provinces of BARMM more generally.
&ldquo;The end result is a shrunken BARMM that can no longer claim to represent all of Muslim Mindanao,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, IPAC senior adviser.
The Supreme Court ruling, in response to a petition from Sulu submitted six years earlier, came as it was becoming increasingly clear that the MILF was going to lose control of the autonomous region it had fought for in a long struggle that ended with a comprehensive peace agreement and the creation of BARMM in 2019. An opposition coalition known as the Bangsamoro Grand Coalition (BGC) was poised to win the first-ever BARMM parliamentary elections, then scheduled for May 2025, to be held at the same time as national mid-term elections for mayors and governors. The Supreme Court ruling led to the postponement of the parliamentary elections; the undercutting of the BGC; and the removal of one of its leaders, Sulu Gov. Sakur Tan, from contention for the all-powerful position of BARMM Chief Minister. The likely outcome is now some form of power-sharing between the MILF&rsquo;s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) and the BGC.
In the meantime, violence is rising in Central Mindanao as the old Maguindanao clans, which dominate what is left of BARMM, compete among each other for power, spoils, and backing from Manila. It is also rising in Basilan where a power struggle between two popular half-brothers is intensifying. The biggest security problem for the future is probably in Sulu, where the ethnic Tausug from the MNLF and the much-weakened Abu Sayyaf Group now have little political representation. Gov. Tan can keep any grievances under control for now. The potential for upheaval in the longer term, however, is high.

Cover photo.jpeg

 Sulu’s exclusion from the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) via a Supreme Court ruling serves the interests of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the short term and no one in the long term.

Philippines: The Impact of Sulu's Exclusion from BARMM

[Jakarta, 28 January 2025]&nbsp;The November 2024 regional executive elections in Papua, Highland Papua, and Central Papua were marred by violence and allegations of fraud, with the noken system of proxy voting at the heart of the controversy. The report rejects the Indonesian government&rsquo;s conclusion that the problem can be solved by ending direct elections and suggests instead that more resources be poured into cleaning up voter rolls, allocating more resources for voter education and poll monitoring, ensuring better election supervision and punishing fraud.
<a title="Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending &quot;Noken&quot;" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/%28IPAC_Report_100%29-Indonesia-Election-Credibility-in-Papua-Requires-Ending-Noken.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">"Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending &lsquo;Noken&rsquo;&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), reveals widespread electoral irregularities in Papua&rsquo;s three most populous provinces. The elections delivered surprising victories for &ldquo;dark horse&rdquo; candidates, but the results remain contested. All defeated candidates for governor have filed petitions to the Constitutional Court, seeking to overturn the results and disqualify the winners. 
&ldquo;The use of noken &ndash; a vaguely defined proxy voting practice where community leaders vote on behalf of constituents &ndash; is the biggest problem because it routinely produces 100 per cent turnouts &ndash; or higher &ndash; and improbable margins of victory and defeat,&rdquo; says Deka Anwar, IPAC analyst. Jakarta&rsquo;s Constitutional Court, and many Papuan politicians, claim that letting an influential local leader vote on behalf of his village, neighborhood, or clan is a traditional practice in Papua, but in fact, it is a pretext for avoiding doing the kind of work necessary to ensure a semblance of democracy there.
Scrutiny of the election results show manipulation by candidates, administrators and supervisors at all levels. If dark horse candidates won, it does not necessarily mean that they were more popular or mounted more effective campaigns. Too often it means more strategic use of noken, combined with money politics.
IPAC argues that Jakarta&rsquo;s continued acceptance of noken voting, and its indifference toward the fraud it engenders, reflects a pattern of treating Papua as a region where lower standards can be applied and political rights can be flouted with impunity. It urges the Indonesian government to take the first step toward credible elections in Papua by ending noken voting.

Photo-IPAC-report-100.jpg

The November 2024 regional executive elections in Papua, Highland Papua, and Central Papua were marred by violence and allegations of fraud, with the noken system of proxy voting at the heart of the controversy. 

Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending "Noken"

[Jakarta, 15 November 2024] Indonesian voters will go to the polls on 27 November to choose their provincial governors and district heads, and nowhere is likely be more tense than Papua. Indonesia&rsquo;s easternmost region was carved up into six provinces in 2022, and four of them will be choosing local executives for the first time. Local elections in Papua are often problematic because of difficulties with logistics, corruption, lack of witnesses, ethnic rivalries, and in some cases, disruption by insurgents. It may be worse than usual this time round, especially with election administration in the new provinces &ndash; which means election observers from civil society are desperately needed.
<a title="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-98-Potential-Fraud-and-Violence-in-Papuas-Approaching-Elections" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/2024-11-14Final-FrmtPotential-Fraud-and-Violence-in-Papuas-Approaching-Elections-eng.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua&rsquo;s Approaching Elections&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC), takes a close look at the governors&rsquo; races in three provinces: Papua, Central Papua and Highland Papua. The latter two are among the new provinces; they also happen to be the areas where pro-independence guerrillas are most active.
&ldquo;Contrary to popular belief, the biggest problem in these elections isn&rsquo;t going to come from the insurgents or the military &ndash; it&rsquo;s going to come from individuals trying to rig the vote to get more spoils for themselves and their backers,&rdquo; says Deka Anwar, IPAC analyst.&nbsp;
One official from Papua province was caught on audio record last month outlining how money would be distributed to ensure that his candidate, the former police chief of Papua, would win.&nbsp;
The report notes that the General Election Commissions (Komisi Pemilihan Umum) at the national and provincial levels have tried to address some of the flaws of the past by a variety of measures, including by scanning vote-tallying forms with a smart phone app to try and ensure against discrepancies. But some of their solutions may actually make matters worse, for example, by reducing the number of polling stations.
&ldquo;The 2022 division of Papua hasn&rsquo;t made elections any easier,&rdquo; says Anwar. &ldquo;But the answer is not to go back to the indirect elections of the New Order, as some have suggested. For these elections, coming up in two weeks, independent observers may be the best answer. For the future, to really fix the system, it&rsquo;s a question of resources, voter education, and political will in Jakarta.&rdquo;
&nbsp;

Photo-IPAC-report-98.jpg

Indonesian voters will go to the polls on 27 November to choose their provincial governors and district heads, and nowhere is likely be more tense than Papua.

Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua’s Approaching Elections

[Jakarta, 8 August 2024] President Marcos and his advisers should stay neutral on the coming 2025 parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The recommendation comes as some in the president&rsquo;s inner circle are suggesting that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) needs another three years in power &ndash; one more election cycle to consolidate the peace.
<a title="Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections" href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-97-Philippines-Avoiding-a-Zero-Sum-Game-in-the-2025-BARMM-Elections-pdt.pdf.pdf" target="_blank" rel="noopener">&ldquo;Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections&rdquo;</a>, the latest report from the Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict (IPAC) in Jakarta and the third in a series on the elections, looks at increasing violence as two large parties and many small ones compete to win seats in the Bangsamoro Parliament and secure the all-important position of Chief Minister in May 2025. The main contest will be the MILF&rsquo;s United Bangsamoro Justice Party (UBJP) and an alliance of traditional clan leaders known as the Bangsamoro Grand Coalition (BGC).
&ldquo;The idea that peace depends on the MILF staying in power is flawed,&rdquo; says Sidney Jones, IPAC&rsquo;s senior adviser. &ldquo;If it&rsquo;s not clear that the BGC will do any better, it&rsquo;s also not clear that they will do any worse.&rdquo; A BCG victory would, however, end the hope that BARMM, with its unprecedented experiment in parliamentary democracy, could fundamentally change the political culture of the region.
IPAC notes that there is no guarantee that the unfinished business of the peace process in BARMM, especially the final round of decommissioning of MILF combatants, will be any closer to completion by 2028, mainly because the armed combatants constitute the MILF&rsquo;s strongest bargaining chip. No progress has been made on dismantling of private armed groups; the biggest source of violence as the elections approach is targeted assassinations by unidentified gunmen. If some fear that an MILF defeat could lead to a loss in patronage and therefore dangerous discontent among former fighters, the president and his advisers should be helping craft a better-managed reintegration program rather than trying to prop up one side in power.
The report is a snapshot of election preparations as of July 2024. It examines the electoral strength of the parties that have registered to take part in the election, the alliances being formed, the internal rifts, and the ethnic and regional issues involved. And critically, it examines the political interests of key actors in Manila and how these could affect the outcome in BARMM.
&nbsp;

Photo-report-97.jpeg

President Marcos and his advisers should stay neutral on the coming 2025 parliamentary elections in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM).

Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections

<a href="https://understandingconflict.sgp1.digitaloceanspaces.com/dashboard/IPAC-Report-96-Is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah-updated.pdf.pdf">IPAC-Report-96-Is-this-the-end-of-Jemaah-Islamiyah-updated</a>

Photo1.jpg

On 30 June 2024, sixteen senior leaders of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) gathered in Bogor and issued a statement dissolving the organisation.

Research Reports

Indonesia: The Danger of Middle-Aged Recidivists

Philippines: The Impact of Sulu's Exclusion from BARMM

Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending "Noken"

Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua’s Approaching Elections

Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections

Is this the end of Jemaah Islamiyah? (Updated)

About

Publications

Connect with Us

Research Reports

Search

Indonesia: The Danger of Middle-Aged Recidivists

Philippines: The Impact of Sulu's Exclusion from BARMM

Indonesia: Election Credibility in Papua Requires Ending "Noken"

Potential Fraud and Violence in Papua’s Approaching Elections

Philippines: Avoiding a Zero-Sum Game in the 2025 BARMM Elections

Is this the end of Jemaah Islamiyah? (Updated)

About

Publications

Connect with Us